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6 Family Health Benefits 
and Worker Turnover
Dan A. Black 
Syracuse University
One of the major differences between the labor markets in the 
United States and Canada lies in the treatment of health benefits. 
While Canada relies on government provision of health care, employ 
ers in the United States provide health insurance to most of the 
employed. The U.S. government's role is primarily to provide health 
insurance to those over 64 years of age through the Medicare system 
and to the poor through the Medicaid system. Despite the recent calls 
for health care reform in the United States, the reliance on employer- 
provided benefits appears to be a feature of the U.S. system for some 
time to come. The Clinton health care proposal of 1994 and the 
numerous Congressional alternatives rely on employer-provided health 
benefits.
In this chapter, I examine the impact of employer-provided health 
benefits on job turnover. I focus on a peculiar aspect of employer-pro 
vided health benefits: because many employer-provided plans extend 
coverage to a worker's entire family, the value of an employer's 
employment offer to a worker depends on whether the worker's spouse 
provides the family with health benefits. If a worker's spouse has 
employer-provided health insurance for his family, the worker will 
value employment offers with and without health insurance benefits 
differently than a worker whose spouse does not have employer-pro 
vided health benefits. Importantly, this distortion arises from the reli 
ance on employer-provided benefits and is independent of any 
preexisting conditions clauses or issues concerning the portability of 
health plans. As I show in a later section (p. 273), this is potentially a 
large distortion. According to the April 1993 Supplement of the Cur 
rent Population Survey (CPS), among full-time workers, at least 23
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percent of the women and 12 percent of the men have coverage from 
their spouses.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
There is no obvious reason why employers should provide health 
benefits. While health insurance is less expensive in groups, there is no 
particular reason the groups should be based on place of employment. 
Indeed, the initial growth in employer-provided health was the result of 
firms offering health insurance to their workers during World War II to 
avoid wage controls. As Long and Scott (1982) and Woodbury (1983) 
emphasized, the U.S. tax codes provide the major impetus for the 
employer provision of health and other benefits. The magnitudes of 
the tax savings are surprising. Consider a university in the Common 
wealth of Kentucky that offers an insurance policy whose market value 
is $131 a month to a college professor who has a 28 percent marginal 
tax rate for the federal income tax (family income between $36,900 
and $89,150 for married couples filing jointly). How much would it 
cost to increase the professor's after-tax income by $131 per month in 
1993? Assuming the professor's wages are not over the social security 
cap of $57,600 and taking into account Kentucky's 6 percent state 
income tax and the deductibility of state income taxes from the federal 
tax bill, the university would have to pay more than $250 a month.
As a result of the substantial tax savings associated with the 
exemption of health benefits from federal and state taxation, employers 
have become the major providers of health benefits in the United 
States. The tax expenditures for the tax deductibility of employer 
health care premiums now exceed tax expenditures on the home mort 
gage deduction. 1
Economists have long recognized that the association of fringe 
benefits and employment may affect the employment relationship. 
Lazear (1979, 1981) argued that firms use defined-benefit pensions to 
defer compensation in jobs with agency problems or in jobs with large 
investments in specific human capital. In jobs with agency problems, 
the deferred compensation deters the worker from shirking; while, in 
jobs with specific human capital, the deferred compensation reduces
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job turnover.2 Thus, employers in the United States may use their pen 
sion plans to improve the efficiency of labor contracts, an option that 
many Canadian employers do not have. Lazear and the literature that 
his papers generate (e.g., Ippolito 1985; Hutchens 1987; Dorsey 1987) 
recognized that deferred compensation is not without its costs and may 
have to be implemented with other policies such as restrictions on 
hours and mandatory retirement to mitigate those costs. 3
Firms are not, however, perfectly able to tailor the parameters of 
their pension plans to meet contracting needs of individual employees. 
As Scott, Berger, and Black (1989) and Scott, Berger, and Garen 
(1995) emphasized, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) requires 
firms to offer fringe benefits in a manner that does not discriminate 
against the firm's low-wage employees. If the firm wishes to offer an 
executive a defined-benefit pension plan that defers compensation, the 
firm must offer her secretary a similar plan. Thus, firms are not able to 
structure fringe benefit packages to match perfectly the optimal con 
tract for each employee.
The requirement that fringe benefits be offered in a nondiscrimina- 
tory manner has a special bite in the provision of health benefits. 4 
While firms may tie pension benefits to the earnings of the worker, the 
firm must offer all full-time workers the same health benefits, which 
has the predictable consequence that high-wage firms will avoid hiring 
low-wage workers (Scott, Berger, and Black 1989). Madrian (1994) 
identified another possible distortion that employer-provided health 
benefits create: the possibility that workers will be locked into their 
jobs because they or family members have preexisting conditions and 
would lose their medical coverage if they changed employers. Using 
the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey, she estimated that job 
lock reduces voluntary job turnover by 25 percent as compared with a 
system of perfectly portable health insurance. Madrian's results are 
controversial. Holtz-Eakin (1994) found no evidence of job lock. 5 If 
her results are correct, however, Madrian has identified a potentially 
important distortion in the U.S. labor market that employer-provided 
health insurance creates. Obviously, labor markets in Canada, with its 
perfectly portable health insurance, are free from such distortions.
Madrian argued that job lock arises from coverage gaps that preex 
isting conditions clauses and length-of-service provisions create. If a 
worker must wait, say, six months before being covered by a new
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employer's plan, then the worker may choose not to switch employers. 
Because this coverage gap is unrelated to the efficient allocation of 
labor, such a reduction in mobility is inefficient. She suggested that 
eliminating preexisting condition clauses and increasing the portability 
of health insurance would largely eliminate the inefficient reduction in 
job turnover. In the next section, I offer a theoretical model that chal 
lenges this suggestion. I show that when dual-earning couples con 
sider employment offers, the value placed on a job offer will depend on 
the coverage of the spouse's health plan. As I demonstrate in the next 
section, this difference in valuation may explain the turnover pattern 
that Madrian uncovered.
JOB SEARCH WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR DOUBLE 
COVERAGE OF HEALTH BENEFITS
In this section, I construct a simple model to examine the impact of 
the double coverage of health benefits on labor turnover. To abstract 
from other issues, I will assume that there are no preexisting conditions 
provisions and no length-of-service provisions. If a worker finds 
employment at an alternative employer who is offering health insur 
ance, the coverage begins immediately.
To begin, first consider a worker who has no spouse. The worker is 
currently employed at a firm paying wage w0 and a health plan indexed 
by the value h0. I assume that all health plans may be indexed by a sin 
gle value, h, and that workers always strictly prefer plans with a greater 
h. Workers without health coverage have a plan with the value of h0 = 
0. Let the worker have a utility function u(») that depends on the level 
of wages, WQ , and the level of health benefits, /i0 , or
V°= W(w0 ,^). (1)
The value of current employment, V°, forms the reservation utility for 
all subsequent employment offers. The worker has worked for the cur 
rent employer for one period and will work, at most, one additional 
period for the employer. In Figure 1,1 depict an indifference curve for
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Figure 1 Indifference Curve for Worker's Utility Function
W
h
the worker's utility function as a convex function. If firms could indi 
vidually tailor their fringe benefit packages to the needs of a worker, 
the worker would simply pick the amount of health benefits he desires. 
If the worker had adequate coverage from another source, he could 
simply elect to take all compensation as wages. Unfortunately, IRS 
regulations preclude such a design.
Before beginning employment in the second period, the worker 
entertains employment offers from other employers, which I assume 
are exogenously determined. The worker's utility in the second-period 
is
V = max[«(wfl ,/ifl ),V0 ]. (2)
where u(wa,ha) is the utility associated with the best alternative offer. 
In Eq. 2, the set of acceptable offers is simply all combinations of (w,/z)
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that are above the indifference curve V° depicted in Figure 1. The 
probability that a worker leaves his current employer, therefore, 
depends on the joint distribution of wages and health benefits offered.
Now consider a worker with a spouse. Let hs denote the value of 
the worker's coverage under his spouse's health plan. If the worker has 
no such coverage, then hs = 0. The worker's utility from employment 
in the first period is
V°=M[w0 ,max(/?0 ,/iJ )]. (3)
Again, before beginning employment in the second period, the 
worker entertains offers from alternative employers. The utility from 
second-period employment is
(4)
The value of the right-hand sides of Eq. 3 and Eq. 4 depends on the 
value of hs. Spouse-provided health care benefits, therefore, alter the 
value of current employment and thus alter the value of alternative 
offers.
Figure 2 illustrates how the coverage by a spouse's plan affects the 
worker's job mobility decision. In Figure 2A, I consider the case 
where hs < hQ , or the worker's own plan is more generous than his 
spouse's plan. The indifference curve V° denotes a worker's indiffer 
ence curve if hs = 0, with the point (w0, /z0) denoting the worker's cur 
rent contract. From Eq. 3, spouse-provided coverage (h0 > hs > 0) 
clearly does not alter the value of current employment, but it may 
affect the value of alternative offers. To see why, consider the point 
(WP/ZJ), where ws is implicitly defined as
V° = u(ws ,hs ). (5)
The wage ws leaves the worker indifferent to his current position and 
the job offering ws and consuming his spouse's health insurance. Any 
job that pays a wage greater than ws will be strictly preferred to his cur 
rent position. Thus, the area under the indifference curve V° and above
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Figure 2 Indifference Curves for Worker's Utility Function When 
(A) Worker's Own Benefits are More Generous (hs < HQ) 




the wage ws , denoted as A in Figure 2A, becomes a part of the set of 
acceptable offers. For workers with spouse-provided coverage, there 
fore, the likelihood of turnover unambiguously increases whenever hs < 
h0 . Unlike the analysis of Madrian, this result does not depend on the 
lack of portability of benefits but is the direct result of the increase in 
the acceptable offer set that double coverage provides.
In Figure 2B, I consider the case in which hs > h0 , where the 
spouse's benefits are more generous than the worker's own. Again, 
the indifference curve V° corresponds to the worker without coverage 
by his spouse's benefits, or hs = 0. When a worker's spouse provides 
access to more generous benefits, the worker's utility increases. The 
indifference curve V 0 ', depicts the worker's indifference curve when 
hs > h0 . In comparing the values of current employment of workers 
with and without spouse-provided coverage, there are two regions of 
interest. First, the area under the indifference curve V 0 ' and above V°, 
denoted as region B, represents offers that would be acceptable to 
workers without spouse-provided coverage but that are not accept 
able to workers with spouse-provided coverage. Thus, one effect of 
spouse-provided coverage, when hs > hQ , is to reduce this portion of 
the acceptable offer set. The second region of interest, however, off 
sets this result. The region that lies above vv0 and below the indiffer 
ence curve V°, denoted as region C, represents an area of offers that 
are acceptable to the workers with spouse-provided coverage but are 
unacceptable to workers without spouse-provided coverage. As the 
worker does not use his own health benefits, any job that offers a 
wage greater than w0 is strictly preferred to his current situation, 
regardless of the level of health benefits associated with the job. For 
workers with hs > hQ , therefore, spouse-provided coverage has an 
ambiguous impact on turnover probabilities.
My analysis has abstracted from the search decision of the 
worker's spouse. When allowing for joint search decisions, the 
worker's valuation of his current job and alternative offers depends not 
only on his spouse's current position but also her best alternative offer. 
While the impact of the spouse-provided coverage on a worker's turn 
over probabilities is ambiguous, the impact on efficiency is unambigu 
ous—having a worker's valuation of an employment offer depend on 
his spouse's health insurance plan only limits the efficient allocation of 
labor.6
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Of course, my analysis has not considered the possible responses 
of firms. One obvious response to double coverage is to offer employ 
ees the ability to select other benefits or cash in the place of health care 
benefits. The Revenue Act of 1978 permitted establishment of such 
cafeteria plans. The economic rationale for offering such plans is obvi 
ous: by allowing employees who already have other sources of cover 
age to select from other benefits or cash payments, firms may reduce 
their turnover.
Another way in which firms may counter the problem of dual cov 
erage is to attempt to specialize in the hiring of workers of one type of 
coverage or another. For instance, a firm may seek to hire only work 
ers with access to alternative forms of health care coverage by offering 
jobs with higher wages and no health benefits. Another firm may seek 
to specialize in the hiring of workers who wish to provide coverage to 
their entire families by offering low wages but a generous health plan 
with family coverage. See Dye and Antle (1984) for a model of such a 
separating equilibrium applied to fringe benefits.
COVERAGE, DOUBLE COVERAGE, AND REFUSAL OF 
EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH BENEFITS
In this section, I present an overview of employer-provided health 
benefits from the April 1993 Supplement to the CPS. The supplement 
provides detailed information about employee benefits. I limit my 
sample to workers between the ages of 18 and 64 for all of the tables. 
In addition, I report most statistics for full-time workers, which I define 
to be those who usually work at least 35 hours a week and those who 
work at least 47 weeks a year. I demonstrate that neither the use of caf 
eteria plans nor sorting strategies on the part of firms have solved the 
problem of double coverage. I show that a significant portion of the 
population has double coverage, that a surprising number of people 
turn down coverage, and that among those who turn down coverage, 
most do so without explicit compensation.
Nearly 90 percent of the male workers and 90 percent of the 
female workers have health insurance from some source (Table 1). For 
female workers, 88.0 percent reported that they are at a firm that offers
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Table 1 Mean Coverage Rates for Employer-Provided Health Benefits for 
Full-Time Workers
Female Male
Benefit situation (%) (%)
Covered by some form of health insurance
Employed at firm that offers health insurance
Eligible for employer-provided health insurance
Covered by employer-provided health insurance
Refused employer-provided health insurance
















SOURCE: April 1993 Supplement to the CPS.
health insurance to at least some workers at the firm, and 88.5 percent 
of males responded similarly. Firms can place some restrictions on 
who may qualify for insurance. Often times, temporary, part-time, or 
leased employees may not be eligible for health benefits. Also, many 
firms require length-of-service requirements a worker must complete 
before qualifying for health benefits. To see who is and is not eligible 
for health benefits, I identify workers as eligible for health benefits if 
they reported that their firm offers health insurance to some of its 
workers and either reported that they received those benefits or explic 
itly stated that they declined those benefits. Using this definition, 83.7 
percent of female workers and 85.0 percent of male workers reported 
that they are eligible for benefits.
Looking at the coverage rate of employer-provided health plans, 
79.5 percent of all men but only 72.5 percent of women reported that 
they have employer-provided health benefits. Thus, gender differences 
in wages understate the true compensation difference. Nearly 8.2 per 
cent of women and 10.1 percent of men do not receive health insurance 
from their employers but do receive it from another source. The differ 
entials between the eligibility rates and the coverage rates suggest that 
many workers refuse health insurance coverage and, indeed, 11.2 per 
cent of all women and 5.6 percent of all men decline coverage from 
their employers. 7 Among full-time workers, 22.0 percent of all women
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and 10.7 percent of all men reported that they have health insurance 
under their spouse's plan. 8
The CPS Supplement also gives us an opportunity to examine 
another issue: the health insurance coverage of the self-employed. 
Folklore suggests that the spouses of the self-employed provide the 
health coverage for the family. I examine this issue in Table 2 by com 
paring the rate at which the spouses of the self-employed provide 
health insurance to their spouses as compared with the rate at which 
the spouses of wage and salary workers provided health insurance to 
their spouses. In Panel A we see no evidence supporting this folklore. 
The husbands' provision of health insurance to their wives is indepen 
dent of their wives' self-employment status, which is surprising. In 
contrast, in Panel B wives are more likely to provide self-employed 
husbands with health insurance than are wives of wage and salary 
workers. Women with self-employed spouses are 66 percent more 
likely to provide their husbands with health insurance than are women 
whose spouses are not self-employed.
Table 2 Spouse's Provision of Employer-Provided Health Benefits by 
Self-Employment Status
Spouse is not Spouse is 
Insurance provision self-employed self-employed n
Panel A: Husband's provision of health insurance to spouse 
by wife's self-employment status
Husband does not provide spouse 56.6% 56.3% 4006 
with employer-provided insurance
Husband provides spouse with 43.4% 43.7% 3077 
employer-provided insurance
n 6387 696 7083
Panel B: Wife's provision of health insurance to spouse 
by husband's self-employment status
Wife does not provide spouse 84.5% 74.0% 7297 
with employer-provided insurance
Wife does provides spouse with 15.5% 26.0% 1527 
employer-provided insurance
n 7314 1510 8824 
SOURCE: April 1993 Supplement to the CPS.
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The model presented in the previous section suggests that employ 
ees whose spouses also have employer-provided coverage may value 
job offers differently than employees whose spouses do not have such 
coverage. For dual coverage to have an important effect on labor-mar 
ket transitions, however, there must be a sizable portion of the working 
population that may have double coverage. To determine what fraction 
of dual-earning couples have dual health coverage, I matched hus 
bands' and wives' responses to the April Supplement for those house 
holds in which both members are full-time, full-year workers. In Table 
3, I present evidence about the possibility of double coverage. For 
males, 80.3 percent of the men from dual-earning households are eligi 
ble for health insurance from their employers, and their spouses are also 
eligible for family benefits. Thus, over 80 percent of these males could 
be covered by their wives' plans, and 38.5 percent of these men have 
wives who elect to provide family benefits. Similar stories arise for 
men whose employers offer family coverage: 80.6 percent of men who 
are eligible for family coverage have wives whose employers offer fam 
ily plans. Interestingly, 38.0 percent of men from dual-earning house 
holds who are eligible for family health plans have wives who provide 
family health plans, representing a sizable segment of the married, 
dual-earning families. Workers with spouses who have their own 
employer-provided health benefits may value family health benefits dif 
ferently than workers whose spouses do not have employer-provided 
health benefits: 84.9 percent of these male workers have spouses who 
are eligible for employer-provided health benefits, and 62.4 percent 
have spouses who receive employer-provided health benefits.
Table 3 presents similar statistics for full-time female employees: 
84.6 percent of women in dual-earning households who are offered 
health insurance have spouses who are eligible for family plans, and 
58.6 percent have spouses who provide family health benefits. Thus, 
women are more likely to have access to health benefits from multiple 
sources than are men. Of women who are eligible to provide family 
health benefits, 84.9 percent of their spouses are eligible for family 
health benefits, and 58.0 percent provide such benefits. Finally, of 
women in dual-earning households who are eligible for family health 
benefits, 87.7 percent are married to men who are eligible for health 
benefits, and 76.5 percent are married to men who have employer-pro 
vided benefits.
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Table 3 Dual Health Care Coverage of Married, Full-Time Couples3
Coverage Percentage n 
Husband's employer offers
Health benefits and spouse is eligible for family 80.3 2636 
health benefits
Health benefits and spouse provides family health benefits 38.5 2636
Family health benefits and spouse is eligible for family 80.6 2630 
health benefits
Family health benefits and spouse provides family 38.0 2630 
health benefits
Family health benefits and spouse is eligible for health 84.9 2650 
benefits
Family health benefits and spouse receives health benefits 62.4 2645 
Wife's employer offers
Health benefits and spouse is eligible for family 84.6 2650 
health benefits
Health benefits and spouse provides family health benefits 58.6 2222
Family health benefits and spouse is eligible for family 84.9 2085 
health benefits
Family health benefits and spouse provides family 
health benefits
Family health benefits and spouse is eligible for health 
benefits







SOURCE- April 1993 Supplement to the CPS.
a To be included in this sample, workers must be working full-time and eligible for
employer-provided health benefits. Spouses may or may not be eligible for health
benefits but must be full-time workers.
When employers only partially pay for health benefits, employees 
have an incentive not to accept health benefits when they receive cover 
age from their spouses' plans. The refusal of health benefits is not 
uncommon; 11.2 percent of all female workers and 5.6 percent of all 
male workers decline employer-provided health benefits (see Table 1). 
In Table 4,1 examine the incidence of workers from dual-earning 
households refusing employer-provided health benefits by whether or 
not the workers' spouses are eligible for family health benefits. The
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table indicates that 3.1 percent of male workers whose spouses are not 
eligible for family health benefits refuse coverage, but 12.9 percent of 
workers whose spouses are eligible for family health benefits refuse 
coverage. Thus, male workers who have spouses who are eligible for 
family health coverage are more than four times more likely to refuse 
employer-provided health benefits than are men whose wives are not 
eligible for family health benefits. The impact for females is even 
more dramatic. Only 4.1 percent of women whose spouses are not eli 
gible for family health benefits refuse employer-provided benefits, but 
26.7 percent of women whose spouses are eligible for family health 
benefits refuse employer-provided benefits. Thus, women whose hus 
bands have access to family health benefits are six times more likely to 
refuse health benefits than women whose husbands do not have access 
to family health benefits.
Table 4 Full-Time, Married Couple's Refusal of Employer-Provided 
Health Benefits"
Decision
Spouse is not eligible 
for family 
health coverage
Spouse is eligible 
for family 
health coverage n
Panel A: Husband's decision to accept or refuse 
employer-provided health insurance
Husband accepts employer- 
provided insurance












Panel B: Wife's decision to accept or refuse 
employer-provided health insurance
Wife accepts employer- 95.9% 73.3% 1707 
provided insurance
Wife refuses employer- 4.1% 26.7% 515 
provided insurance
n 343 1879 2222
SOURCE: April 1993 Supplement to the CPS.
a To be included in this sample, workers must be working full-time and eligible for
employer-provided health benefits. Spouses may or may not be eligible for health
benefits but must be full-time workers.
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When husband and wife search for employment and employers 
offer health insurance coverage for the whole family, my theory pre 
dicts that the husband's and wife's health care coverage decision 
should be negatively correlated. Thus, controlling for other factors that 
affect the demand for health insurance coverage, we should see the 
likelihood of a worker choosing employer-provided health insurance 
declining when his spouse has selected employer-provided health 
insurance. To test this hypothesis, I estimate a bivariate probit model 
that allows for correlation between the husband's and wife's decisions. 
I limit the sample to couples where both are full-time, full-year work 
ers. 9 For covariates, I use a vector of race dummies (whites are the 
excluded category), a vector of education variables (high school gradu 
ates are the excluded category), the number of children in the house 
hold less than 18 years old, a quadratic in the worker's age, a quadratic 
in the worker's tenure at the firm, and a dummy variable indicating that 
the worker's tenure is less than a year. The method of estimation is full 
information, maximum likelihood. The starting values were taken 
from probits on the individual equations, and the starting value for the 
correlation coefficient, p, is zero.
The estimated coefficients on the covariates provide few surprises 
(Table 5). Workers of both genders have strong tenure effects. It seems 
unlikely that length-of-service requirements would account for the 
strong tenure-health benefits relationship, so the strong relationship 
may simply reflect the fact that matches that offer health benefits tend 
to survive while those that do not offer health insurance do not survive, 
a point that Mortensen (1989) and Garen (1988) made in examining 
the wage-tenure relationship. Workers with at least a BA degree are 
more likely to have health insurance than less educated workers. A 
larger number of children reduces the likelihood of having employer- 
provided health insurance for women, while the relationship is not sta 
tistically significant for men. Interestingly, hispanic wives are more 
likely but hispanic husbands are less likely to have employer-provided 
health insurance than similar whites. Similarly, black wives are more 
likely to have employer-provided health insurance than are white 
wives.
Controlling for the worker's own characteristics, there is a strong, 
negative correlation between husbands' and wives' health care deci 
sions. The estimated correlation coefficient is -0.35 and the z-statistic
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Table 5 Health Insurance Coverage for Dual Earning Couples, 




Worker is Native American
Worker's age
Age squared /1 00
Worker has less than one year of tenure
Worker's tenure
Tenure squared / 100
Number of children
Worker did not begin high school
Worker did not complete high school
Worker attended college but has no degree
Worker has a vocational degree from junior 
college
Worker has an associate's degree
Worker has a bachelor's degree
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Worker has a Ph.D. degree























NOTE- Mean of the dependent variable for females 0.6465 and for males is 0.7727. 
Absolute values of z-statistics are given in parentheses.
is -9.03. Thus, the data overwhelmingly reject the hypothesis that the 
health care decisions of dual-earning couples are independent and 
accept the hypothesis, which my theory implies, that the decisions are 
negatively correlated. Husbands and wives appear to coordinate their 
search activities, presumably looking for other forms of compensation 
when their spouses provide health benefits. Thus, within households, 
there is some evidence that workers do indeed trade off health benefits 
for other forms of compensation.
DOES SPOUSE-PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE AFFECT 
TURNOVER PROBABILITIES?
The analysis earlier suggested that coverage under a spouse's 
health insurance plan alters the worker's likelihood of accepting an 
offer. If the spouse's plan is less generous than the worker's own 
health insurance plan, then coverage by the spouse unambiguously 
increases the likelihood that a worker will accept another offer. In 
equilibrium, therefore, we should see such workers more likely to 
change jobs than workers without spouse-provided coverage. When 
the spouse's plan is more generous than the worker's own plan, there is
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an ambiguity, but it remains possible that spouse-provided coverage 
would result in higher turnover rates.
Unfortunately, the CPS is a less than ideal data set to use to exam 
ine job transitions. Because the CPS is a short panel and provides few 
details about a worker's employers, it is often impossible to spot job- 
to-job transitions. In the April 1993 Supplement, however, workers 
were asked directly if they have less than one-year tenure, and answers 
to this question allow me to identify those individuals who have 
changed jobs in the last year. It is not possible, however, to determine 
whether the transition was a result of a quit, layoff, or dismissal.
The CPS provides only workers' current health insurance and not 
their coverage at the time of their job transitions, which causes a poten 
tially serious problem. If workers who have recently had an involun 
tary job transition (layoff or dismissal) are likely to enroll in their 
spouses' health care plans, then there is a correlation between current 
health care coverage under a spouse's plan and turnover that is unre 
lated to any search story. In addition, the CPS provides no information 
about the generosity of workers', or their spouses', health care plans. 
As the generosity of the two plans affects the likelihood of turnover in 
my model, this data limitation is particularly serious. Finally, the CPS 
provides no information about tenure on the previous job. As virtually 
all research has found that hazard functions for employment spells 
exhibit duration dependence (e.g., Farber 1994), the failure to include 
tenure in a turnover equation may cause a specification bias. 10
With these caveats in mind, I can examine the relationship between 
job transitions and health insurance coverage provided by a worker's 
spouse with the equation:
Pi(job change) = F(Xfi + Sfi + ut ). (6)
where Xt is a vector of controls, (3 is the corresponding vector of 
parameters, Sl is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the worker 
is covered by his spouse's plan and zero otherwise, 8 is the correspond 
ing parameter, u, is the error term that I assume is identically and inde 
pendently distributed, and F(«) is a logistic distribution function.
Because males and females may have much different patterns of 
turnover, I run separate equations for male and female workers. In addi-
Family Health Benefits and Worker Turnover 283
tion to controls for whether the spouse is employed or self-employed, I 
use the same control variables as those I use in Table 5 except, of course, 
I use no controls for tenure. In column 1 of Tables 6 and 7,1 present the 
estimates for Eq. 6 for male and female workers. I limit my sample to 
workers who are married, full-time, full-year workers who have at least 
two years of potential experience, where potential experience is defined 
to be age minus years of schooling minus six. This restriction should 
exclude most school-to-work transitions, which presumably occur 
regardless of the spouse's provision of health benefits. 11
A common feature of the results from both samples is that having 
an employed spouse substantially reduces the likelihood of workers 
changing jobs. (This result remains regardless of whether I control for 
coverage by the spouse's health insurance plan.) Spouse-provided 
coverage has a large impact on the likelihood of turnover for male 
workers; evaluated at the mean, spouse-provided coverage increases 
the likelihood of a male worker changing jobs from about 0.10 to 
0.16. 12 For females, the impact is smaller but still large; evaluated at 
the mean, spouse-provided coverage increases the likelihood of a 
female worker changing jobs from about 0.10 to 0.14.
My estimates for males are somewhat higher than those of 
Madrian (1994), who found that not having other health insurance cov 
erage lowered male job transitions by about 26 percent. 13 Importantly, 
Madrian was able to control for whether the job transition was volun 
tary, and I am unable to do so. 14 To guard against the possibility that 
spouse-provided coverage is somehow indicative of an involuntary 
transition from the last job, I reestimate the equation, limiting my sam 
ple to those workers who report that they are eligible for employer-pro 
vided health insurance (see column 2 of Tables 6 and 7). For this 
sample, workers who made job transitions at least have the option of 
taking their employer-provided plan. While clearly this does not pre 
clude a worker from having been laid-off or dismissed from his past 
position, this does eliminate any workers who have spouse-provided 
benefits because they have no alternative source of health care. With 
this sample restriction, the coefficients on the spouse-provided cover 
age are reasonably stable. Evaluated at the means, spouse-provided 
coverage increases the likelihood of a male worker changing jobs from 
0.07 to 0.11 and the likelihood of a female worker changing jobs from 
0.07to0.12. 15
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NOTE: Mean of the dependent variable for column (1) is 0.096 and for column (2) is 0.069. Absolute values of z-statistics are given in 
parentheses.
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NOTE: Mean of the dependent variable for column (1) is 0.097 and for column (2) is 0.074. Absolute values of z-statistics are given in 
parentheses.
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Thus, the CPS data seem to support the conclusion that spouse- 
provided coverage does encourage job transitions, and the results are 
largely consistent with those of Madrian (1994) for workers with dual 
coverage. Her interpretation, however, is that workers without dual 
coverage are possibly "locked-out" of jobs that offer insurance with 
preexisting conditions clauses or length-of-service requirements. 
Health care reform that eliminates preexisting conditions clauses and 
length-of-service requirements and requires employers to offer health 
insurance would virtually eliminate job-lock. Unless the employer 
mandate also eliminates variations in the type of employer-provided 
coverage, my analysis suggests that the turnover that spouse-provided 
coverage creates is likely to persist. Ideally, therefore, we would like 
to be able to distinguish my search explanation from her job-lock 
explanation and be able to decompose the turnover effect into a search 
component and a job-lock component.
That is likely to prove a difficult task. Gruber and Madrian (1994) 
and Holtz-Eakin (1994) contended that most job-lock appears to be a 
short-run problem, presumably arising more from the length-of-service 
requirements than from preexisting conditions. 16 Individuals without a 
preexisting condition, however, have the option of purchasing insur 
ance from the private market, or, as Gruber and Madrian emphasized, 
some workers may purchase health care from their previous employers 
to bridge the gap in coverage that length-of-service provisions create. 
This solution to a coverage gap is expensive: the worker loses the tax 
exemption of health care insurance premiums, and, if purchasing 
health insurance from the private market, individual policies are often 
more expensive. Yet for these workers, a solution does exist, and a suf 
ficiently generous offer will induce the worker to change jobs. 
Because this solution is expensive and because workers with spouse- 
provided coverage avoid these costs, workers differ in their valuation 
of offers from alternative employers, which, of course, is the essence of 
my search explanation for the turnover effect from spouse-provided 
coverage. In my view, distinguishing between these two explanations 
would be difficult.
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS
My results support the findings of Madrian (1994) and Gruber and 
Madrian (1994) that employer-provided health insurance does affect 
the turnover propensities of workers. Indeed, the magnitude of my 
results for male workers is somewhat larger than Madrian's estimate, 
and I find that female workers are similarly affected. While I have 
offered no formal welfare analysis of this effect, it is difficult to believe 
that a policy that makes a worker's turnover propensity dependent on 
the health care policy of his spouse would improve the efficiency of 
labor markets.
Why have employer-provided health insurance? Friedman (1993) 
argued that many firms initially offered health care as a fringe benefit, 
as a means of avoiding the wage-price controls of World War II. As the 
IRS did not initially count fringe benefits as a part of taxable income, 
the tax system encouraged firms to offer health care, and Congress 
eventually codified the tax exemption. As health benefits are income 
elastic (Woodbury and Huang 1991), the tax exemption favors those 
with high earnings. Therefore, equity concerns suggest that a change 
is in order as well. When efficiency and equity concerns agree, one 
hopes that economists would find the course of action uncontroversial.
The political appeal of continuing the employer-provision of 
health benefits or the expansion of the system through mandates seems 
to arise because the costs remain hidden from consumers. Gruber 
(1994) and Gruber and Krueger (1992) suggested that most, if not all, 
costs of mandated benefits are passed through to the workers as lower 
wages, but if the mandated program is sufficiently small, these wage 
pass-throughs may be difficult for workers to perceive. Moreover, the 
tax expenditure that arises from the exemption of employer-provided 
health insurance is not readily apparent. Those of us who are benefi 
ciaries of the tax expenditure probably do not appreciate the largesse of 
the U.S. government, at least not until the exemption is threatened.
Unfortunately, any elimination of the tax subsidy of health insur 
ance benefits would not be invisible. Consider a reform along the lines 
that Diamond (1992) suggested, but one without any tax subsidy for 
middle-class families. In such a plan, employer-provided health insur 
ance is replaced with a system of mandatory coverage where, at least
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for most middle class households, consumers pay the full cost of their 
health insurance. Those workers who previously had employer-pro 
vided health insurance should receive a nice increase in compensation. 
Under Diamond's proposal, regional "HealthFeds" negotiate several 
different policies with insurance companies, and consumers within the 
region choose among the approved policies. When consumers begin 
looking at the prices of the various policies, however, they will notice 
that, even if firms increased their compensation by the exact cost of the 
previously provided health insurance, the increase in their compensa 
tion is not enough to allow them to purchase an insurance plan of com 
parable quality to their employer-provided plan. Because the tax 
subsidy is eliminated, the income and substitution effects presumably 
would move most consumers to purchase less generous insurance 
plans. Woodbury and Huang's simulation results suggest that the full 
taxation of health benefits may result in up to a 15 percent decline in 
the amount of health insurance. They calculated these estimates for the 
1986 U.S. tax codes, and marginal tax rates have increased since then. 
Forcing consumers to understand fully the costs of health care may not 
be good politics but, in my view, it is good economics.
Notes
I thank Susan Black and Mike Clark for research assistance. Paul Anglin, Michael 
Baye, William Custer, Daniel Hamermesh, and seminar participants at the University 
of Kentucky provided useful comments. The National Institutes for Health provided 
research support.
1. Statistical Abstract of the United States 1993, Table 515. The tax expenditure on 
employer-provided pension plans is the largest single tax expenditure ($70.5 bil 
lion), followed by employer contributions to health insurance ($63.2 billion), and 
the mortgage interest deduction ($48.1 billion).
2. See Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1993) and Luzadis and Mitchell (1991) for 
recent evidence.
3. The U.S. government no longer allows firms to use mandatory retirement provi 
sions.
4. Hutchens (1986) presented evidence that pensions, when coupled with the nondis- 
criminatory provision of the IRS codes, causes firms not to hire older workers. 
Scott, Berger, and Garen (1995) argued that health benefits may dissuade firms 
from hiring older workers as well.
5. Monheit and Cooper (1994), who also used the National Medical Expenditure 
Survey, found evidence of job lock using a much different methodology than
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Madrian. Using SIPP data, Gruber and Madrian (1994) found evidence that the 
1985 COBRA legislation that allows workers to buy insurance from past employ 
ers as well as earlier state legislation that also allowed limited portability 
increased labor turnover and substantially mitigated job lock.
6. My analysis ignores many other issues that concern most search models. To name 
but a couple, I have not considered the distinction between unemployed and on- 
the-job search, nor have I considered the intensity at which workers attempt to 
generate new offers. Given the underlying ambiguity about the impact of double 
coverage on the workers' turnover decisions, these extensions would not appear 
too useful. Perhaps more important, for simplicity, I do not consider the joint 
search problem of a wife and husband. In a model with such a joint search deci 
sion, a worker may refuse a job with a higher wage and more health benefits if it 
will allow his spouse to take a sufficiently attractive offer.
7. Not all workers decline extra coverage: 12.1 percent of all women and 8.7 percent 
of all men in the sample of full-time workers reported that they have coverage 
from at least two sources.
8. This estimate of 10.7 percent differs considerably from Madrian's estimate of 
33.5 percent using the National Medical Expenditure Survey, although it is condi 
tional on being married. Of course, our two samples differ considerably because I 
am requiring males to be full-time, full-year workers to be in the sample. As a 
consistency check on the data, I matched the husbands and wives in the April Sup 
plement. Among married males, 15.1 percent reported that their spouses' plans 
cover them; 30.8 percent of spouses of these men, however, reported that they 
chose a family health insurance plan, which is clearly closer to Madrian's estimate 
of 33.5. It is important to keep in mind, however, that offering a family plan does 
not imply that this coverage is free. Employers may charge the employee some or 
all of the additional costs for obtaining family coverage.
9. Olson (2000) looked at the labor-supply decision and how it may be affected by 
the spouse's health insurance coverage.
10. The CPS is not the only data set that suffers from these limitations. To my knowl 
edge, no data set with good labor-market information provides detailed analysis 
of health insurance benefits. As Madrian (1994) notes, the National Medical 
Expenditure data lack measures of worker tenure; workers' insurance coverage 
can only be determined at two points in time, 7 to 15 months apart, and not at the 
time of job transition. As she notes, there are similar problems with the use of the 
PSID and NLSY. I am currently working with my colleagues Mark Berger and 
Frank Scott to use the SIPP data set to examine the impact of insurance coverage 
on worker turnover. While the SIPP does contain continuous information on 
health insurance coverage, it does not contain information about the generosity of 
workers' health care plans nor of their spouses' plans.
11. I am grateful to Daniel Hamermesh for this suggestion.
12. Recall that, in logit models, the change in the probability of the dependent vari 
able equals one for a change in they'th independent variable is, for the ith worker,
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13. In her specification, Madrian included health care coverage from any source, not 
simply spouse-provided coverage. As sources of coverage other than the worker's 
spouse include Medicaid and Champus, I was afraid that these individuals may be 
different from the population as a whole. For this reason, I use dual coverage aris 
ing from some source other than a spouse as a separate variable.
14. It is by no means obvious that we should exclude involuntary transitions. If 
spouse provision of employer-provided allows workers to accept jobs in riskier 
occupation, higher involuntary turnover rates may be an outcome of spouse-pro 
vided health benefits.
15. These results are robust to various other specification checks. For the male por 
tion of the sample, I divided the sample into age categories and reestimated the 
equations for each category. Despite the relatively small cell size, the coefficients 
on spouse-provided coverage are always positive and generally statistically signif 
icant. Similarly, if I include a family income variable, undoubtedly endogenous, 
the coefficient remains statistically significant and of similar magnitude to that 
reported in Table 4. Moreover, if I included nonmarried workers, the coefficient 
remains statistically significant.
16. Among full-time employees who have changed jobs within the last year and have 
jobs with firms that offer health insurance, 14 percent report that they are ineligi 
ble for coverage because they have not completed a "probationary period," which 
I interpret as a length-of-service requirement. In contrast, 0.7 percent claim to be 
ineligible because of a preexisting condition, and another 3.0 percent report that 
they have a preexisting condition not covered by their health care plan.
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